But it seems like origin features can be a good basis for relational properties. Then, relational properties can act as proper reasons for love. In the duplicate child case, I think the mother has no obligation to the duplicate, because she has no shared history with them to properly justify the relevant type of relationship which in turn acts as a reason for love.
Put another way, if the the shared history is what gives me a reason to love my child rather than their duplicate, then at the moment my child is born I have no reason to love them because the shared history is not present. It seems that love that is conditioned upon a shared history is deserving of the title "conditional love".
I think the fact that the non-duplicate is her child is sufficient reason for the relationship in the first place. Sorry, I shouldn't have used the term 'shared history' before I think that's introducing confusion on my part.
Appreciate your comment! Maybe I'm misunderstanding your comment but let me know what you think of this:
If the shared history is ultimately what acts as a reason for love, then it seems that the origin feature (the fact that my child is my child) does not itself provide a reason for love. And that's all I'm trying to say. I think you're right that a reason for love often "comes along" with an "origin feature". I think that's compatible with the view that I argued for here.
It's also possible I'm misunderstanding you! But you say in the article: "Facts about the origin of a person - of the cause of their being - do not seem to have much to do with love." This, and the section it's excerpted from, is what I take issue with. I think the origin feature is a prerequisite of the sort of relationship that would justify the parental obligation. So I think the origin fact is inextricably linked to love.
This was thoughtfully written. Another thing that I think complicates an argument for the unconditionality of parental love is the way that parental love predicates itself on ownership. Under patriarchy, this is often demonstrated by a man's ownership of his family. Ownership takes many forms, but in this near-universal contextual reality, the ownership implied with the words "my child" or "my children" are especially telling. The question becomes whether it is truly possible to love someone that you have ownership over, not whether it is possible to love due to explicitly casual reasons rooted in biology
But it seems like origin features can be a good basis for relational properties. Then, relational properties can act as proper reasons for love. In the duplicate child case, I think the mother has no obligation to the duplicate, because she has no shared history with them to properly justify the relevant type of relationship which in turn acts as a reason for love.
Put another way, if the the shared history is what gives me a reason to love my child rather than their duplicate, then at the moment my child is born I have no reason to love them because the shared history is not present. It seems that love that is conditioned upon a shared history is deserving of the title "conditional love".
I think the fact that the non-duplicate is her child is sufficient reason for the relationship in the first place. Sorry, I shouldn't have used the term 'shared history' before I think that's introducing confusion on my part.
Appreciate your comment! Maybe I'm misunderstanding your comment but let me know what you think of this:
If the shared history is ultimately what acts as a reason for love, then it seems that the origin feature (the fact that my child is my child) does not itself provide a reason for love. And that's all I'm trying to say. I think you're right that a reason for love often "comes along" with an "origin feature". I think that's compatible with the view that I argued for here.
It's also possible I'm misunderstanding you! But you say in the article: "Facts about the origin of a person - of the cause of their being - do not seem to have much to do with love." This, and the section it's excerpted from, is what I take issue with. I think the origin feature is a prerequisite of the sort of relationship that would justify the parental obligation. So I think the origin fact is inextricably linked to love.
This was thoughtfully written. Another thing that I think complicates an argument for the unconditionality of parental love is the way that parental love predicates itself on ownership. Under patriarchy, this is often demonstrated by a man's ownership of his family. Ownership takes many forms, but in this near-universal contextual reality, the ownership implied with the words "my child" or "my children" are especially telling. The question becomes whether it is truly possible to love someone that you have ownership over, not whether it is possible to love due to explicitly casual reasons rooted in biology