It's not viciously circular to define "woman" as someone who identifies as a woman. It is true that the phrase "identifies as a woman" technically contains a use of the term "woman," provided that "woman" functions as a term here rather than part of a multi-word term. But everyone understands "identifies as a woman" to be equivalent to "uses the word 'woman' to describe themselves and/or prefers to be called 'she/her.'" And once the definition is rewritten that way, the use of "woman" disappears. All that's left is a mention of the term, and words about the person's use of the term. But a definition of a term t is only circular in the traditional sense if it contains a use of t.
This is a great point. I plan on making another post about 4 different ways the self-ID definition of the word "woman" or "man" can avoid circularity. I agree that there are instances in which people seem to be defining a use of the word woman in terms of a mention (or a mention in terms of a use). For various reasons, I don't think that all or even the majority of people who use the self-ID definition are doing that (however, there are certainly many people who define the word "woman" in the way that you describe).
Calling something fallacious does not equal an actual argumentation. Can you reasonably assert a definition of what a woman is without any biological categories nor resorting to something which is at its base, cyclical?
Beyond that, there is no real academic consensus on Socrates fallaciousness. If he is fallacious then the only epistemic which can be employed is a post-modern or some post-structuralist mood.
If you cannot actually answer grounding problems or root your definition in objective realities then the issue is not with requesting a definition — it’s the poor quality of the framework in question.
All in all, you endeavored to refute Matt’s argument, without actually asserting what a woman is. (Thus proving his point. Even more, proving that the modern frame must take issues with definitions for it cannot tolerate meaning.)
You don't understand what I said. I never said Walsh's definition of the word "woman" is wrong, or that trans women are women. All I argued is that you can't infer from someone's inability to define a word satisfactorily that they don't know what the word means, which is something Walsh has implied many times.
Well you would be wrong to imply this, for reasons mentioned in the article. You can't give necessary and sufficient conditions for most terms - yet you can know what they mean.
The guy already said, I think, more than three times that you are not understanding the thesis he is defending in the article. That should give you pause, brother.
This argumentation implicitly rejects the knowability of things such as this. More — the communicability of concepts and the ability to rightly recognize essence.
If things have inherent meaning then some definitions are satisfactory others are not. If nothing means anything no definition can be satisfactory.
In other words, Socrates is not fallacious if one is an essentialist. If one is not an essentialist, all discussions regarding definitions are fallacious because there is no such thing as a definition. Definitions are just arbitrary social constructs which we wrangle about.
Which is why I noted that not all academics agree regarding the supposed “Socratic fallacy”
Hence my disagreement.
I very much understand what you are saying. I am saying that your assertions regarding definitions and their communicability are false, and that Matt’s claims are non-fallacious.
I'm not saying there is no such thing as an "essence" or that words don't have "inherent" or fixed meanings. I'm just saying that you can fail to define a term satisfactorily and still know what a word means. Philosophers have been trying to give a satisfactory definition of the word "knowledge" for a very long time and every definition we've cooked up has counterexamples - and yet we clearly know what the word knowledge means! If we didn't know what it meant, we wouldn't be able to identify counterexamples.
It's not viciously circular to define "woman" as someone who identifies as a woman. It is true that the phrase "identifies as a woman" technically contains a use of the term "woman," provided that "woman" functions as a term here rather than part of a multi-word term. But everyone understands "identifies as a woman" to be equivalent to "uses the word 'woman' to describe themselves and/or prefers to be called 'she/her.'" And once the definition is rewritten that way, the use of "woman" disappears. All that's left is a mention of the term, and words about the person's use of the term. But a definition of a term t is only circular in the traditional sense if it contains a use of t.
This is a great point. I plan on making another post about 4 different ways the self-ID definition of the word "woman" or "man" can avoid circularity. I agree that there are instances in which people seem to be defining a use of the word woman in terms of a mention (or a mention in terms of a use). For various reasons, I don't think that all or even the majority of people who use the self-ID definition are doing that (however, there are certainly many people who define the word "woman" in the way that you describe).
Great piece!
Ostensive definition time!
Calling something fallacious does not equal an actual argumentation. Can you reasonably assert a definition of what a woman is without any biological categories nor resorting to something which is at its base, cyclical?
Beyond that, there is no real academic consensus on Socrates fallaciousness. If he is fallacious then the only epistemic which can be employed is a post-modern or some post-structuralist mood.
If you cannot actually answer grounding problems or root your definition in objective realities then the issue is not with requesting a definition — it’s the poor quality of the framework in question.
All in all, you endeavored to refute Matt’s argument, without actually asserting what a woman is. (Thus proving his point. Even more, proving that the modern frame must take issues with definitions for it cannot tolerate meaning.)
You don't understand what I said. I never said Walsh's definition of the word "woman" is wrong, or that trans women are women. All I argued is that you can't infer from someone's inability to define a word satisfactorily that they don't know what the word means, which is something Walsh has implied many times.
You can in fact imply that in this instance which is the point.
Well you would be wrong to imply this, for reasons mentioned in the article. You can't give necessary and sufficient conditions for most terms - yet you can know what they mean.
The guy already said, I think, more than three times that you are not understanding the thesis he is defending in the article. That should give you pause, brother.
He wrongly asserted I did not comprehend. I do comprehend— my objection is that the Socratic fallacy is invalid for the reasons I have asserted.
Womanhood and manhood are as scientifically observable as water, which is an example cited in the article.
Nothing in what I've said or written denies this.
This argumentation implicitly rejects the knowability of things such as this. More — the communicability of concepts and the ability to rightly recognize essence.
If things have inherent meaning then some definitions are satisfactory others are not. If nothing means anything no definition can be satisfactory.
In other words, Socrates is not fallacious if one is an essentialist. If one is not an essentialist, all discussions regarding definitions are fallacious because there is no such thing as a definition. Definitions are just arbitrary social constructs which we wrangle about.
Which is why I noted that not all academics agree regarding the supposed “Socratic fallacy”
Hence my disagreement.
I very much understand what you are saying. I am saying that your assertions regarding definitions and their communicability are false, and that Matt’s claims are non-fallacious.
I'm not saying there is no such thing as an "essence" or that words don't have "inherent" or fixed meanings. I'm just saying that you can fail to define a term satisfactorily and still know what a word means. Philosophers have been trying to give a satisfactory definition of the word "knowledge" for a very long time and every definition we've cooked up has counterexamples - and yet we clearly know what the word knowledge means! If we didn't know what it meant, we wouldn't be able to identify counterexamples.