I appreciate the thoroughness of different senses of "innocent," but the dictionary analysis leaves out how it is used in context. "Innocent" is often used as a dialectical move.
A: "It's wrong to kill human beings!"
B: "Ah, but what about capital punishment, self-defense, and just war cases? Aren't those counterexamples to that moral principle?"
A: "Those aren't relevant in abortion cases, so I'll restrict the moral principle so that whatever your stance on those issues is, it is compatible with the moral principle operative in abortion cases: It's wrong to kill *innocent* human beings."
The assumption here is not some dictionary definition of "innocent" (neither Webster nor Oxford have any claim to philosophical authority), but the following: *if* killing a human being is permissible in the above cases, what makes them permissible is, at least in part, just punishment or incapacitation of a lethal and morally responsible aggressor. We can certainly quibble about self-defense cases against non-morally-responsible aggressors (a lion, say) or non-aggressive-but-human threats to your life (few and far between, outside cases like ectopic pregnancies), or even about what one can permissibly intend in self-defense cases (Lockean they-lose-their-right-to-life-therefore-lethal-intent versus Thomistic no-lethal-intent-but-side-effect). Whatever the outcome of those debates, (a) the sense of "innocence" will be exactly the same in fetal as adult cases and (b) the *vast* majority of elective abortions will be such that fetuses are "innocent" in the relevant sense.
"Human being" already entails the possibility of being the relevant sort of moral status (even if it is false that being human is sufficient); "innocence" indicates that a being's moral status is not enough to determine the (im)permissibility of killing. Since moral status is the only thing relevant in abortion cases (except, perhaps, life-threatening pregnancies), "innocent" functions to bring the conversation back to the moral status of fetuses. That's why it gives the illusion of being question-begging or entailing personhood; it's purpose is to remind us that considerations besides moral status are irrelevant.
One might, of course, want to head off a response like B's in the first place, and so include "innocent" without going through the above dialogue.
As for other begged questions, merely passing the explanatory buck is not an objection. You're right that those who think that being a human organism is morally significant owe an explanation for what makes such a category significant (and many have - Christopher Kaczor, for example, has a chapter in "The Ethics of Abortion" defending the "all humans are persons" view). But those who think that the exercise of certain intellectual or mental activities *also* owe the same sort of explanation. What makes thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and other mental states morally relevant? Why assess moral status on the basis of developmental capacities or individual activities at a timeslice, rather than natures or natural kinds over characteristic lifespans? (And if we adopt the latter standpoint, humanoid zombies won't count as human organisms, but severely disabled or irreversibly comatose humans will.) As you note, these are open questions.
Be careful about giving psychologizing explanations for the apparent weakness of philosophical arguments (like that the terms are meant to have an exclusively rhetorical effect, or that an interlocutor naively thinks that shorter explanations are better ones), lest others psychologize you. Another (more generous) explanation is that nothing should be taken for granted in abortion debates, and it's possible that there be mutually exclusive, but rationally coherent and philosophically defensible views on a difficult moral matter. And not all those with rationally coherent and philosophically defensible views are able to adequately present robust arguments in defense of those views. That's frustrating, to be sure, but not a sign of irrationality or underhandedness. The view that persons are "an individual substance of a rational nature" (Boethius) has millennia-long philosophical traditions to bolster it and has a central place in the history of "human rights," which helps to explain why so many take its corollary - that all human organisms are persons in the sense relevant to moral obligation - to be self-evident. They may not be aware of this history, or be able to adequately defend its bases (and, again, I understand the frustration at this deficiency), but loving our interlocutors means taking into account their role in a community where there is a wide distribution of intellectual labor, and then attributing to them the *best version* of their view.
Now that I re-read your comment, I am quite convinced by what you said regarding the dialectical use of the word "innocence", and I agree that just going through the dictionary definitions was not a good approach. I still think going through those definitions was worthwhile, as I have spoken with pro-lifers who use those dictionary definitions.
And it isn’t even necessarily true that it’s always wrong to kill innocent human beings because if a toddler was, say, stabbing you, or had a gun and could shoot you at any moment, you wouldn’t be obligated to just let them or stand idly by simply because they don’t understand the harm they are causing or could cause. It just so happens that in most cases it would take far less than lethal force to stop a toddler from killing or causing grievous bodily harm. That isn’t true of a fetus. But the issue is that pro lifers conflate the dangers of a fetus inside a living person’s body with that of a toddler or baby in a crib. They are not the same, even if both “innocent”
I largely agree with this - yes, people use "innocent" to ward off these "but what about this obviously justified killing of a human being" style objections. Yes, both sides need to explain why they think fetuses enjoy or do not enjoy moral status.
My aim here was not to address the best version of the pro-life view, or even to argue that fetuses are not persons, but to respond to a misunderstanding about this argument that is exhibited by many everyday pro-life people. Those everyday people usually take the claim that fetuses are "human beings" to be quite uncontroversial and innocent. They very often take themselves to be saying something that is supported by "basic biology" or something to this effect. My aim here is to show that this is mistaken.
As you seem to be saying, what we really want is a supporting argument for the first premise - an argument that gives us reason to think that fetuses are persons, or members of some moral category. Philosophers like Kaczor give us that supporting argument. What bothers me is that when everyday pro-life people give this
"Innocent human being" argument, they do not realize that a supporting argument is needed. Fetuses are human beings, end of story.
I appreciate the thoroughness of different senses of "innocent," but the dictionary analysis leaves out how it is used in context. "Innocent" is often used as a dialectical move.
A: "It's wrong to kill human beings!"
B: "Ah, but what about capital punishment, self-defense, and just war cases? Aren't those counterexamples to that moral principle?"
A: "Those aren't relevant in abortion cases, so I'll restrict the moral principle so that whatever your stance on those issues is, it is compatible with the moral principle operative in abortion cases: It's wrong to kill *innocent* human beings."
The assumption here is not some dictionary definition of "innocent" (neither Webster nor Oxford have any claim to philosophical authority), but the following: *if* killing a human being is permissible in the above cases, what makes them permissible is, at least in part, just punishment or incapacitation of a lethal and morally responsible aggressor. We can certainly quibble about self-defense cases against non-morally-responsible aggressors (a lion, say) or non-aggressive-but-human threats to your life (few and far between, outside cases like ectopic pregnancies), or even about what one can permissibly intend in self-defense cases (Lockean they-lose-their-right-to-life-therefore-lethal-intent versus Thomistic no-lethal-intent-but-side-effect). Whatever the outcome of those debates, (a) the sense of "innocence" will be exactly the same in fetal as adult cases and (b) the *vast* majority of elective abortions will be such that fetuses are "innocent" in the relevant sense.
"Human being" already entails the possibility of being the relevant sort of moral status (even if it is false that being human is sufficient); "innocence" indicates that a being's moral status is not enough to determine the (im)permissibility of killing. Since moral status is the only thing relevant in abortion cases (except, perhaps, life-threatening pregnancies), "innocent" functions to bring the conversation back to the moral status of fetuses. That's why it gives the illusion of being question-begging or entailing personhood; it's purpose is to remind us that considerations besides moral status are irrelevant.
One might, of course, want to head off a response like B's in the first place, and so include "innocent" without going through the above dialogue.
As for other begged questions, merely passing the explanatory buck is not an objection. You're right that those who think that being a human organism is morally significant owe an explanation for what makes such a category significant (and many have - Christopher Kaczor, for example, has a chapter in "The Ethics of Abortion" defending the "all humans are persons" view). But those who think that the exercise of certain intellectual or mental activities *also* owe the same sort of explanation. What makes thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and other mental states morally relevant? Why assess moral status on the basis of developmental capacities or individual activities at a timeslice, rather than natures or natural kinds over characteristic lifespans? (And if we adopt the latter standpoint, humanoid zombies won't count as human organisms, but severely disabled or irreversibly comatose humans will.) As you note, these are open questions.
Be careful about giving psychologizing explanations for the apparent weakness of philosophical arguments (like that the terms are meant to have an exclusively rhetorical effect, or that an interlocutor naively thinks that shorter explanations are better ones), lest others psychologize you. Another (more generous) explanation is that nothing should be taken for granted in abortion debates, and it's possible that there be mutually exclusive, but rationally coherent and philosophically defensible views on a difficult moral matter. And not all those with rationally coherent and philosophically defensible views are able to adequately present robust arguments in defense of those views. That's frustrating, to be sure, but not a sign of irrationality or underhandedness. The view that persons are "an individual substance of a rational nature" (Boethius) has millennia-long philosophical traditions to bolster it and has a central place in the history of "human rights," which helps to explain why so many take its corollary - that all human organisms are persons in the sense relevant to moral obligation - to be self-evident. They may not be aware of this history, or be able to adequately defend its bases (and, again, I understand the frustration at this deficiency), but loving our interlocutors means taking into account their role in a community where there is a wide distribution of intellectual labor, and then attributing to them the *best version* of their view.
Speaking of intellectual labor, there are much better pro-life philosophers than Marquis (famous though his essay is). I recommend the Kaczor book I mentioned earlier as well as this collection of essays: https://www.routledge.com/Agency-Pregnancy-and-Persons-Essays-in-Defense-of-Human-Life/Colgrove-Blackshaw-Rodger/p/book/9781032015149
Now that I re-read your comment, I am quite convinced by what you said regarding the dialectical use of the word "innocence", and I agree that just going through the dictionary definitions was not a good approach. I still think going through those definitions was worthwhile, as I have spoken with pro-lifers who use those dictionary definitions.
And it isn’t even necessarily true that it’s always wrong to kill innocent human beings because if a toddler was, say, stabbing you, or had a gun and could shoot you at any moment, you wouldn’t be obligated to just let them or stand idly by simply because they don’t understand the harm they are causing or could cause. It just so happens that in most cases it would take far less than lethal force to stop a toddler from killing or causing grievous bodily harm. That isn’t true of a fetus. But the issue is that pro lifers conflate the dangers of a fetus inside a living person’s body with that of a toddler or baby in a crib. They are not the same, even if both “innocent”
I largely agree with this - yes, people use "innocent" to ward off these "but what about this obviously justified killing of a human being" style objections. Yes, both sides need to explain why they think fetuses enjoy or do not enjoy moral status.
My aim here was not to address the best version of the pro-life view, or even to argue that fetuses are not persons, but to respond to a misunderstanding about this argument that is exhibited by many everyday pro-life people. Those everyday people usually take the claim that fetuses are "human beings" to be quite uncontroversial and innocent. They very often take themselves to be saying something that is supported by "basic biology" or something to this effect. My aim here is to show that this is mistaken.
As you seem to be saying, what we really want is a supporting argument for the first premise - an argument that gives us reason to think that fetuses are persons, or members of some moral category. Philosophers like Kaczor give us that supporting argument. What bothers me is that when everyday pro-life people give this
"Innocent human being" argument, they do not realize that a supporting argument is needed. Fetuses are human beings, end of story.